The Use of Risk Management Tools in Countering the Terrorist Threat
Dr. Michael C. Clarke, CPEng, FIEAust. MAusIMM, RPEQ
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Michael Clarke was previously a Senior Lecturer in the School of Environmental Engineering, Griffith University, Queensland Australia. He obtained a PhD and M.Eng.Sc from the University of Sydney and BE from the University of New South Wales. His interest in terrorism came from teaching and research in Risk Management as it is used in industry and commerce, and how it must now incorporate the consideration of the terrorist threat. His interest in the Philippines has come about from regular business and study trips to that country. He has been an occasional commentator of Philippine matters on ABC (Australian Broadcasting Corporation) radio.
Over the last five years, I have had many conversations with my friend and colleague, Professor Paul Wilson, of the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Bond University, Gold Coast, Queensland, Australia. Paul, who is a criminologist by profession, has provided me with a good insight into the behaviour of the criminal/terrorist. I look forward to joining Paul in a future article that combines elements of technology, risk management and psychology as it pertains to terrorism.
This article was inspired by reading the 1997 article by Bruce Hoffman, where the classes of terrorist groups were given as, religious, amateur and professional. Given developments in terrorism since 1997 in terms of the technology available to terrorists and the widening scope of terrorists' targets, it was considered that a new look at the classes of terrorists be considered along with some Risk Management (RM) tools that could be applied to countering the actions of those classes (groups and individuals). The effectiveness of the RM tools is considered, along with the cost to benefit ratio of counter-terrorist actions.
Terrorism like global climate change is not a new phenomenon. Terrorism in the guise of the violent assertions of political action, liberation movements, and pseudo-criminal blackmail, has probably been around for the entire period of developed human existence. Terrorism and global climate change however also have another feature besides longevity in common; they are both very much in the public mind, and for many seem like recent inventions or the latest manifestation of the Wrath of God.
The public perception that terrorism is an invention of recent times is a result of the short memory span of most human beings and particularly the popular press. That terrorism has been shaping human life, governance and economics for a long time is not easily explained on the evening news, and in fact is not really news in terms of the lack of immediacy of the concept.
To develop a strategy for managing the risk of terrorism, the social and the technological aspects of terrorism must be considered in terms of the national/political context in which they occur, the level of technological skill of the perpetrators, and the resolve to cause harm by those individuals. In terms of looking into the future, the political and social causes behind terrorism need to be examined, as well as the technological advances that will increase the effectiveness of terrorism.
The development of terrorism in the Philippines is an example and a warning of what may be seen in the future. The differences that may be expected from terrorism that originates in a developing country as against a developed country need also be examined. Towards minimising the threat of terrorism the means must be found of reducing the level of hate that produces a terrorist's resolve to do harm as well as the flow of technology that facilitates terrorism.
MECHANISMS OF TERRORISM
The first mechanism is the creation of an individual or group with a reason to take terrorist action. William Eubank and Leonard Weinberg discuss this lack of recognition as being a cause for terrorism in their article, Democracy and Terrorism. The desire to be noticed is a strong incentive, and one that drives many individuals and groups with a cause. This desire to be noticed comes from the frustration that common and readily available means recognition, for example access to the media, are not available to individuals and groups with a cause. This desire for recognition is the underlying cause of terrorism. Revenge, jealousy, retribution and criminality are secondary causes.
The second mechanism is the opportunity and social justification for a terrorist act. The opportunity may be the trigger for an act that may be quite spontaneous or may be the result planning with a measured analysis of the effect and possible retribution or consequences (a cost/benefit analysis) to the perpetrator.
The third mechanism is the availability of the means to undertake a terrorist act that will have sufficient impact to mitigate any negative response. It has an implied connection between the sophistication of the terrorist and the chosen technology.
LEVELS OF TERRORISM
State Terrorism, its causes and attributes.
The emergence of a single military superpower, with weaponry that cannot be seriously challenged by any other state is one of the present and developing causes of state sponsored terrorism. The fact that one state, The United States of America, has gained an overpowering military advantage (hegemony) has not and will not necessarily bring peace. It may well prevent open major warfare as was seen in the first half of the twentieth century, but conflicts where the United States has little interest (eg the Sudanese civil war, Bougainville and East Timor) will be allowed to continue without superpower intervention.
In essence, Pax Americanum may satisfy the close allies of the United States, and those states that can live with the fact of an economic, social, as well as military hegemony. That hegemony may however not sit well with states of widely differing social and political values. Small and weak nations are increasingly having difficulty in having their causes and indeed their very existence acknowledged by the superpower.
The ability of smaller nations and national groups to seek solace, help or just to take a counter position with an alternative superpower has disappeared with the demise of the Soviet Union. Since no small stick is effective against US might, then indirect methods of action are the only choice for the disgruntled small and weak nation. The indirect methods will be supporting direct violent terrorism or more subtly using economic (including Information Technology disruption) and social (including criminal) terrorism.
The 11 September attacks were in all probability the result of neo-state sponsored terrorism. The disruption of the US Postal Service by anthrax could possibly also prove to be an act of state (foreign supported) terrorism. Both have hit the target with serious economic and social impacts. The involvement of the previous Panamanian government in the cocaine trade was an example of individual terrorism (fired by the personal greed of Manuel Noriega) combined with state terrorism (the government agencies of Panama reacting against the former neo-colonial power).
Cause Driven Terrorism: religious, social and other cause driven terrorism.
Cause driven terrorism is not new, although it has been given new impetus. Terrorist acts were carried out by those involved in such causes and organisations as, anarchism, International Workers of the World (IWW), the Women's' Suffrage Movement, and Zionism. All those involved believed that the 'End Justified the Means', and many are now considered martyrs, heroes or if still alive, freedom fighters. They received recognition of the World through their actions and in turn achieved their goals. Either in life or death they received the accolades of their contemporaries and future generations.
Some modern examples of cause driven terrorism are:
Islamic/Christian conflict in Indonesia and the Philippines, which is coupled with ethnic cleansing,
Social conflicts such as the Huk uprising (Philippines 1949 - 53) that was based on resistance to entrenched poverty and oligarchic nepotism, and
Aum Shinrikyo (Supreme Truth), Radical Animal Liberation and Eco-terrorism that are based on the development of philosophy of empowerment for social causes but which are too extreme to be taken seriously by the majority.
The Huks are still considered with great affection by many in Central Luzon (Philippines) although their reputation was damaged by association (truly or falsely?) with the Philippine Communist Party. The creation of martyrs in the inter-communal fighting in Indonesia is going on with increasing ferocity. The Aum is waiting for its martyrs to be created by the hangman. In each situation there is or was a cause, and in each situation the terrorists acts bring (have brought) recognition by the local, national and international communities.
Individual and Criminal Terrorism.
Such terrorism is essentially the result of a selfish need for recognition, amusement or gain. It does include, acts of arson for pleasure, systematic brutalisation of individuals and communities, and repayment for past real or imaginary wrongs. The Uni-Bomber had a 'beef' with the US Government and the academic community, the arsonists that lit the Christmas 2001 fires in Australia received a thrill, and the brutalisation of communities in East Timor during 1999 by militias was essentially criminal (inspired by a few militia leaders) backed by elements of the Indonesian state.
In each case of individual and criminal terrorism, the perpetrators received recognition for their action, although in the case of the militia leaders in East Timor, they eventually found that their mentors, the TNI (Indonesian military), were forced to denounce their actions and remove support. For individuals and criminals terrorism is far less likely to bring accolades, and more likely to bring retribution from the state or from the communities that are the victims.
THE TERRORIST THREAT TO INFRASTRUCTURE AND CONFIDENCE
The threat to infrastructure is significant and increasing. Some examples are:
· hard targets hit by physical weapons, The World Trade Buildings, the Pentagon and the Federal Building in Oklahoma,
· a soft target, The US Postal Service brought to a near standstill by the anthrax threat, and
· an even softer target, The Internet hit by the Loveletter[4&5] computer virus (a case of individual terrorism; just for fun, from the Philippines).
Examples of infrastructure exist in every facet of human endeavour and all are vulnerable. Jennifer Caplan, in her article entitled 'Terrorism: The Ultimate Wild Card' describes how corporate Chief Financial Officers, fear terrorism. The fear is rooted in the knowledge that there is no bottom-line to the damage that a terrorist act could do to a corporation. The threat to confidence comes with the knowledge that risk transfer, which is taking out insurance against a terrorist act, is becoming impossible to organise or excessively expensive.
THE TECHNOLOGY OF TERRORISM
In 1993 Paul Wilkinson asked the question 'does modern technology tilt the balance in favour of the terrorists?' Paul answered that question in the affirmative. Since that question was first asked, the opportunity for sophisticated terrorism has certainly increased, with 11 September and the development of cyber-terrorism being confirmation of the continuation of that tilt.
The threat to infrastructure is great because the tools available to terrorists are very considerable. Furthermore as the tools that are available to terrorists are increasing in number and sophistication, then the list of possible targets is also increasing. A terrorist with an imagination will have no problem in finding a juicy target and the appropriate terrorist tools. Three generic types of terrorist tools are considered below.
Much is made of the possibility of a terrorist producing and using a nuclear weapon. It is a faint possibility but such a weapon would in reality have little interest to a terrorist. An 'A Bomb', built by a non-national organisation using power reactor grade or degraded plutonium, would be awkward to construct, difficult to successfully detonate and require a small ship or large mobile cement mixer to transport. It would not be a weapon of choice. A variation on a nuclear weapon would be a radiological device consisting of high level nuclear waste packed with conventional explosive. Again this weapon would have drawbacks to the terrorist in that great personal risk would be had in its manufacture, whilst its detection is probable before detonation, and products post detonation would be detectable and relatively removed from the environment.
Bio-weapons are a class of weapon that terrorists will find increasingly attractive. They are in the realm of technology available to, state, cause driven groups and possibly technically gifted criminals. If a third rate power, in a time of conflict was to unleash a bacteria such as a genetically modified anthrax, then there is the scenario for taking out a large percentage of the world's population. The microbe for such a catastrophic event would need the following characteristics: have long survival rate outside a host, be infectious on human-human contact, be carried by other vectors (species), have a reasonably long infectious period before the on-set of symptoms, be genetically stable and be releasable such that its spread would quickly cross borders and regions. Such a weapon was the goal of Aum Shinrikyo; they only needed a little more time to develop it.
The technology for manufacturing such a lethal bacteria or other microbe is common and well understood. Any country with a basic research facility for disease monitoring and control can turn those facilities over to disease causing agent synthesis and distribution. The facilities to produce a biological weapon also exist in many commercial laboratories, and can be purchased in kit form for as little as a few tens of thousands of pounds or dollars. Such countries or cause driven groups do not need the expensive infrastructure for nuclear weapons to cause mayhem, just a 'bug bomb' kit.
'Bug bombs', such as the anthrax containing letters used recently in the US, may have been developed by a non-national organisation or individual who had the means to steal biological material from the national arsenal. Where national security is weakened by economic or political crisis, as in parts of the former Soviet Union, then such theft is increasingly possible. It would be possible for a talented individual to develop and deploy a bug bomb of mass destruction potential. Its physical effectiveness would depend on the type and strain of microbe, the quantity of biological material and most importantly the method and place of its deployment. The weapon would not need to be very effective in its lethality to cause panic and the loss of confidence in control measures.
A cause driven group, such as Aum Shinrikyo, can likewise call upon its own dedicated members to undertake a chemical weapon development programme took years to produce their desired weapon. Their research and development occurred in both Japan and Australia, with testing on the effectiveness of their chemical agent (Sarin) being first undertaken on Australian sheep (1993/4) and then Japanese civilians in 1994. In this case Australia's keenness to invite Japanese businesses to set up in Australia without seriously questioning their intent, origins and credentials, led to an unwelcome involvement of the group with Australia. (Thankfully it only cost Australia a few sheep!)
A computer virus that has the following features would have the ability to destroy the internet and cause great disruption to commerce, transport and industry. The features would be:
1. Non-detectable to anti virus software at the time of its creation,
2. On a time (or other) delay system,
3. Spreadable by the internet,
4. Compatible to all major operating systems and
5. Introduced in a friendly and wanted format, that will be desired by many users.
The obvious way to 'deliver' such a virus would be initially to incorporate it in a major piece of software (eg a systems upgrade). The scenario would be a software release (over say three months), a timed relay to an email system, thence a timed (or program) triggered systems infection. The Loveletter if incorporated in a software package with a timing protocol could have been such a virus.
Who could create such a terrorist weapon? The answer is that such a virus could be created by a state, a cause driven group or an individual. In the case of the Loveletter, the suspected perpetrator was a Philippine student who had the desire to be noticed. Was he a criminal; was he a hero? That depends on his intent and the stance of those that sit in judgement (his victims) and his own community.
The creation of computer virus depends on knowledge, skills, and the dedication to undertake such an activity. In the case of the Philippine student, the possible damage to his own country and countrymen would have been relatively little, since the Philippines is not a strongly computer dependant country or society. The damage done to the United States, the former colonial power in the Philippines, was considerable. The collateral damage to other developed economies was also considerable. Did the student have a desire to hurt the former colonial masters and their allies? The question to that answer is probably still in the head of the perpetrator.
THE RESOLVE OF THE TERRORIST
To match the tools available to terrorists, is the new level of resolve being found in such groups as the 11 September perpetrators. Their action was founded on four basic pillars, these being: a cause great enough to attract people with education to a suicide mission, patience and resolve, resources (money, organisation and facilitators), and time. The actions of 11 September were an excellent example of project management, with achievable aims and superb organisation with high security. (Intelligence agencies such as MI5, CIA and KGB probably could not have provided better organisation, and would have been lucky to find nineteen/twenty zealots to undertake the mission.)
On an individual scale, the Uni-Bomber, Theodore Kaczynsk, showed resolve (his campaign of terror lasted 17 years) and skills at, victim selection, weapons manufacture, delivery systems and in hiding his identity. On capture, Kaczynsk, has had his manifesto published, and has probably achieved his main goal, recognition.
The resolve, coupled with intelligence, of groups such as the 11 September hijackers and individuals such as Theodore Kaczynsk, makes preventing terrorist acts by such people very difficult, and in some cases impossible. Such people have time on their side as well as ability to keep their secrets till the time they choose to act. Groups and people of lesser intelligence and resolve will be easier to detect, and deter or remove.
RISK MANAGEMENT AS A TOOL FOR REDUCING THE HAZARD OF TERRORISM
The most vulnerable infrastructure is that which is obvious and is considered a key element in an economy or a corporate structure or is an icon of a target culture. Transport and communications systems, utilities, activities that attract wide participation of a big audiences, or symbols of a nation or culture are all prime targets. Military infrastructure, which usually a very hard target, is relatively immune from terrorism, given its high level of security.
The removal of the threat to infrastructure is not really feasible in a broad sense, since the targets are as diverse as the terrorists' imagination. Specific precautions can be taken where copycat actions are considered possible, and for very high profile targets. The financial cost and the social dislocation caused by counter-terrorism (security) measures will be a very significant in the future, and may be seen by terrorists (including those involved in state sponsored terrorism) as part of their success.
Some simple tools can be developed to examine the hazard to infrastructure and specific human activities of terrorism. These are based on a modified HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) system, where a series of question are posed, and thence answered by appropriate personnel. Examples are: Table 1, An Analysis of the Terrorist Hazard to Major Infrastructure, and Table 2, An Analysis of the Terrorist Hazard to Corporate Structure and Table 3, An Analysis of the Terrorist Hazard to a Small to Medium Concern.
Table 1 illustrates how the hazard of terrorism has truly no bounds when it comes to infrastructure. The cost of the attacks on the World Trade Centre will and can never be fully calculated. Besides the loss of life and structures, the loss of confidence to the business community and society is great, and will be on-going. Other major costs of 11 September, are the faltering of confidence in the ability of man to be able to minimise hazard, creation of uncertainty in the ability of emergency services to cope with major crises, and spiralling cost of additional security, whether that security be effective or not. For the Sydney Opera House, a conclusion is drawn that 'immediate additional security is not warranted', despite the building being a cultural icon in Australia, having a very large movement of people through and around it, and having a very high replacement value. The reason for not seeing additional security as a priority for the Opera House, is that Australia still has a relatively low international profile, there have been no major incidents at the site till now, and that Opera House is only one of many possible targets throughout the country.
Table 2 is possibly a more useful tool and is aimed at international corporations who consider themselves possible targets. A company by using such a tool would be able to prioritise its response to the terrorism hazard. It could consider transferring some risk by insurance or by divesting of riskier parts of the business (eg the share of the Middle Eastern pipeline mentioned in the table). Other ways of hazard reduction may include the decision to take lower profile in particular regions or in their approach to business.
Table 3 is the demonstration of the use of a similar tool in looking at the terrorist hazard to a small to medium enterprise (with small to medium being considered as an entity with primarily local ownership and management, and a limited public and commercial profile). The tool is an extension of an occupational health and safety (OH&S) HAZOP exercise, with questions on the terrorism potential being included in the OH&S suite of considerations. It would use an extended employment of local resources in its application, with the terrorism expertise coming from the local emergency services.
At the level of small and middle, enterprises, entities and events (SMEs), Risk Management offers more relevance and likelihood of success in preventing terrorist attacks than examples given in Tables 1 and 2. SMEs will have less need for reliance on 'big-picture intelligence' and more reliance on local interaction of industry, commerce, government and the community. There is less to lose, less to save and less to interest the terrorist who is desires to be recognised. The threat in this case is likely to come from disgruntled employees, contractors, and other service providers, for whom revenge, jealousy, retribution and/or simply criminality are the reasons for their actions.
Risk Management (RM) may be more or less useful at some levels, in some areas and in some instances at combating terrorism in some forms and from some sources. It will never provide full security. Further, RM with hazard reduction will come at a cost. A cost/benefit analysis will in many cases point to inactivity with regard to hazard reduction as being the most appropriate form of response, in other cases the exercise will result in considerable expenditure being warranted.
TO STOP A TERRORIST (OR TERRORIST GROUP)
Returning to the three categories of terrorism, possibly the easiest to stop or curtail is State Terrorism. The means for doing this are:
1. Wave and use a big stick after publicly proclaiming the Terrorist State to be the work of Satin. The need for producing non-ambiguous and verifiable evidence is crucial in this approach,
2. Very privately take covert action (political, military, social and economic) to disarm the state, and/or
3. Publicly accommodate (appease) the desires of the State's rulers and elite so as to encourage them to shun terrorist practices.
The choice of the curtailment measure would be dependant on the situation, and may change as the threat increases or diminishes (as with 1992 and 2003 the North Korean nuclear stand-offs).
For Cause Driven Terrorism the following may work to some extent:
1. Discredit the cause and/or its leaders (accuse the leadership of, graft and corruption, being associated with outside bodies such as the Communist movement, and being involved in anti-social activity, eg child pornography), and
2. Offer alternatives to the cause (greed in place of fundamentalism).
Those individuals and groups with cause driven terrorist intent would be the hardest to dissuade from their goals. Either tireless physical prevention of terrorist acts or very long-term social re-orientation would be needed to prevent such individuals and groups from planning and committing such acts.
For Individual Terrorism:
1. Remove the opportunities (and tools) for a terrorist act,
2. Improve surveillance of those with a recognised propensity for terrorism (those with prior convictions and mental health records) and
3. Use education to dispel notions of martyrdom and heroics associated with terrorism.
The jeopardy of individual and criminal terrorists is recognised by anti-terrorist groups, in that they try and make cause driven terrorism appear as criminally inspired. (The Israeli Government spokespeople regularly refer to Palestinian actions as criminal acts. Israel further uses the word terrorist to describe Palestinian individuals who are casualties, either as active participants or bystanders, in an attempt to remove any martyr status that could come to those casualties.)
Risk Management and terrorism containment
It is demonstrated in the above pages how a modified HAZOP system could be used for 'testing' the likelihood of terrorist action on a particular target. A series of questions are posed, and thence answered by appropriate personnel sitting in a panel. But who would be these appropriate personnel?
To look at any situation that could be under a threat, local knowledge combined with skills in terrorism detection and containment would be needed. People that know a facility, work place or social situation (eg a sports or cultural function) would need to be matched with trained counter-terrorist personnel. The 'test' would either be undertaken at regular intervals or on an as needs basis. If threats were encountered or strong suspicions raised, then the appropriate civil authority would be informed. If national interests were threatened, the civil authority could refer the situation to the military or intelligence forces.
The effectiveness of using HAZOP in occupational health and safety management has been often demonstrated. A problem with HAZOP is that boredom sets in with the panel when during repeated OH&S HAZOP sessions nothing is found to report. In the case of using HAZOP like tools of Risk Management in counter terrorism measures, the boredom will very quickly set in, since most of the time the panel will be reporting no activity or cause for concern. This boredom is essentially a management problem and will need to be addressed by those leading the panels.
THE HUMAN DIMENSION
Terrorism and the threat of terrorism will cause a diversion of funds from other activities, and will thus reduce living standards. Bill Bogart10, produced estimates that 11 September cost the World between 0.75 and 1.25% Global GDP, with developing countries experiencing a loss of 2.9 5% growth. Thus a significant effect of terrorism on the community and individuals will be the loss of opportunity because of resources being directed to counter terrorism
Intelligence agencies, policemen and other law and security services do not create wealth; they are an expense on any balance sheet. To be able to stop another 11 September would be worth a considerable allocation of resources, but unfortunately such an allocation of resources will in many instances be a futile exercise, for the counter terrorism dollar will be spent on chasing hoaxes, myths and shadows.
The response of humans to terrorism as expressed by leaders (politicians) is to express outrage at the thought that terrorists can continue to create mayhem at will. Peter Sandman11, has defined Risk as being a function of outrage and hazard, with hazard being in turn a function of magnitude and probability. Another definition of risk is that it is a function of likelihood and safeguards. Politicians (partially through self interest) will dwell on reducing outrage, and will want to be seen to be emplacing safeguards. The effect that the application of the counter terrorism dollar will be misplaced, and will be directed towards highly visible activities (organising and conducting a second Gulf War with dubious links to terrorism) and not directing resources into intelligence gathering, an activity that can produce real results.
THE DEVELOPING SCENARIO
In an article published 1 September, 2001, Bruce Hoffman pointed out that despite the damage 'a seriously or potentially catastrophic CBRN attack might pose, it is highly unlikely that it will undermine national security and less threaten the survival of a nation like the US ..' Bruce Hoffman was proved right by 11 September in his proposition, in that the US strengthened its national security, and from all indications became a stronger nation. For Europe, Japan and other developed nations terrorism has little chance of seriously affecting the national resolve to maintain business as normal and not let terrorists threaten the populace or government. For developing countries like the Philippines, the positive scenario of national security strengthening and the development of a stronger national will to survive, following a major terrorist action, may not always be the case.
The end of the Huk rebellion (circa 1954) occurred because of the input of State resources (Philippine and US) into fighting the Huk military wing, the disillusionment of many Huk supporters because of the bad behaviour of Huk fighters, the passing (and partial implementation) of legislation that remedied some of the Huk grievances and the simple exhaustion of the Huk fighters and supporters. The same will not necessarily happen to groups involved with the current rebellions in the Southern Philippines. The involvement of many external players in the Southern Philippine rebellions will prolong the fighting and the economic cost. This coupled with innate weaknesses in the Philippine economy, a legitimacy question over the current president, and the failure to undertake social reform, has left that country open to the possibility of a terrorist triggered financial and political collapse.
Small internal conflicts will occur in many developing nations, will fester for a time, and will die out. There is the possibility that some internal conflicts will continue, and develop into mass revolts, as occurred in the European Peasants Revolts of the middle ages and in early years of the Russian Revolution. The likelihood of this scenario is increasing and will be the result of widespread grinding poverty related to over population. This will be the doomsday scenario for some nations, and may be too late to prevent in terms of acceptable (and equitable) human intervention. In that extreme situation 'to be cruel is to be kind actions' may or may not be taken by the nations themselves, or by trans-national bodies.
Bruce Hoffman1 stated in 1997 'every new generation learns from its predecessors, becoming smarter, tougher and more difficult to capture and eliminate'. The continual need for vigilance from terrorist attack adds up to a great human effort with a great cost in resources and probably lives.
The expanding selection of technologies available to terrorists, the 'success' of recent terrorist actions, and the limitless variety of targets makes countering terrorism increasingly difficult. It will not be possible to patrol and otherwise provide physical protection for every possible target. It will be necessary to rely increasingly on civil and military intelligence agencies for stopping terrorists at an early stage in the development of a terrorist initiative. In essence people will be needed to think like a terrorist to possibly stop a terrorist (and hence individuals with mild social paranoia may be in great demand by counter-terrorism agencies).
For people living in developed economies the greater risk to life and limb will be, motor accidents, falling whilst drunk, and being hit by a stray golf ball, than by encountering a terrorist or being caught-up in a terrorist act. The prospects for government and commerce to overreact to outrage and expend excessive resources on counter-terrorism actions are great. Hopefully this overreaction must be tempered by common sense.
Paul Wilkinson referring to 11 September, commented that the vulnerability of the USA to terrorist attack was from intelligence failure that was responsible for the lack of a preliminary warning. How true. May we put more into intelligence gathering, and as Paul goes on to recommend, use the United Nations' diplomatic efforts to resolve conflict.
1. Bruce Hoffman, 'The Confluence of International and Domestic Trends in Terrorism', Terrorism and Political Violence Vol. 9, No. 2, 1997 pp. 1 -15.
2. William Eubank and Leonard Weinberg, 'Democracy and Terrorism', Terrorism and Political Violence Vol. 13, No. 1, 2001 pp. 155 -164.
3. Stanley Karnow, In Our Image. America's Empire in the Philippines. New York, USA: Random House, 1989,
4. Loveletter Virus http://www.europe.f-secure.com/v-descs/love.shtml
5. Loveletter Virus http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2000/05/000510-cyber2.htm
6. Jennifer Caplan, 'Terrorism: The Ultimate Wild Card' CFO Magazine, http://www.cfo.com/article/1,5309,7202|0|||,00.html
7. Paul Wilkinson, Editorial, The Special Issue on Technology and Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence Vol. 5, No. 2, 1993. p 6.
8. New Religious Movements. The University of Virginia. www.religiousmovements.lib.virginia.edu/nrms/aums.html
9. BBC News, World: Americas, Judge calls Unabomber suspect for private meeting. Wednesday, January 7, 1998 Published at 08:45 GMT,
10. Bill Bogart, World Congress on Information Technology (Feb.) 2002, Adelaide Australia
11. Peter Sandman, Responding to Community Outrage. The American Industrial Hygiene Association. Fairfax, Va. 1993.
12. Bruce Hoffman, 'Change and Continuity in Terrorism', Studies in Conflicts and Terrorism Vol. 24, No. 5, 2001 pp. 417 - 428.
13. CBRN; Chemical Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (Weapons)
14. Peter Chalk, Political Terrorism in South East Asia Terrorism and Political Violence Vol. 10, No. 2, 1998 pp. 118-134.
15. Paul Wilkinson, Editorial, Terrorism and Political Violence Vol. 13, No. 4, 2001.
Terrorism Risk Tables
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Author: Michael C Clarke
(Michael C Clarke on Google+)